

mv

25X1

Document No. 002

~~SECRET~~

NO CHANGE in Class.

DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 June 1955

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

Date: 09/02/78 By:

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: "Operation Alert 1955, June 15, 16 and 17"

REFERENCE: Instruction to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, from Office of Defense Mobilization, subject: Operation Alert 1955, dtd 28 April 1955.

1. In accordance with reference, verbal instructions of the Director of Central Intelligence and pursuant to a meeting of the CIA Emergency Planning Task Force, the following procedure for the participation of the components of the Clandestine Services is furnished for necessary planning and appropriate action.

2. Purposes and Scope

a. To participate in "Operation Alert 1955" in conjunction with elements of the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies of the Federal Government.

b. To familiarize members of the Clandestine Services with the redeployment plan, and the relocation site and facilities in order to facilitate the continuing process of improving and extending CIA's emergency preparation.

c. To review the vital documents by responsible officials in order to establish their adequacy for operations during a sustained alert.

d. To test the basic facilities, i.e., billeting, messing, communications, and reproduction, to determine adequacy for extended use.

As a device for accomplishing the above purposes and to ensure effective utilization of personnel at the site, an exercise will be conducted

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

to portray a series of simulated situations calling for realistic actions, recommendations, and decisions by appropriate officials, or their representatives, in executing the essential wartime functions of the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. Assumptions: To provide conditions which will permit opportunities for progressive simulation of wartime functions, the exercise will be developed from two situations.

a. Assumption for First Situation:

(1) Beginning at 1205 EDT June 15 and continuing to 1205 EDT June 16, an initial situation will be assumed (a) that increased world tensions, accompanied by a substantial deterioration in international relationship with the Soviet Bloc is of such magnitude that the President has ordered all agencies and departments of the Executive Branch to alert status and, (b) that the conditions are such that an outbreak of hostilities is expected momentarily.

(2) Requirement for First Situation: Those decisions and actions, in a situation short of war, which are deemed necessary to prepare the Agency for effective execution of its wartime functions.

b. Assumption for Second Situation:

(1) Beginning at 1205 EDT June 16 and continuing to 1700 EDT June 17, a situation will be assumed (a) that certain Strategic Air Command Bases and industrial cities in the northwest and north central United States, including SAC bases in Alaska, have been bombed with nuclear weapons; and (b) that a state of general war exists, in both Europe and Asia. Washington is intact.

(2) Requirement for Second Situation: Those decisions and actions deemed necessary for the execution of the Agency's wartime functions during the first thirty days of a general war.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Planning and Control Mechanism:

a. This will be a Command Post Exercise primarily concerned with actions involving implementation of tentative and/or existing CIA war plans with the concomitant actions and interplay with the Departments of State and Defense.

b. The [redacted] is designated as 25X1
the planning and control mechanism for the preparation and conduct 25X1
of the exercise from the relocation center. Chief, [redacted] will
supervise the activities of the personnel of the Clandestine Services
who operate from the relocation center.

c. In order to provide for the continued security of the re-
location site, the number of personnel from the Clandestine Services
who will participate at the site proper will be limited to twenty-
five (25). This will provide for one senior representative from
each staff and area division, two representatives from Records
Integration and necessary staff personnel from [redacted] It is 25X1
desired that staffs and divisions assure that sufficient personnel
are present in the Washington Headquarters at all times during
the exercise to service actions received from their representatives
at the relocation site. (See Paragraph 4 of extracts from a memor-
andum to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, subject:
Operation Alert 1955)

d. In conformance with the uniform identification to be used
by governmental agencies, all problem messages will be plainly
marked "UNCAP." No problem messages will be dispatched
overseas.

e. Actions generated during the first situation will be serviced
even though such servicing may not be accomplished prior to the
time scheduled for the termination of the first situation. If necessary,
this activity will continue into the second situation or until completed.
Termination time for actions generated in the second situation will
be announced.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

25X1

5. [redacted] should be furnished names of designated representatives not later than 6 June. Representatives so designated will meet with [redacted] in Room 2401 L, at 1000 hours, 8 June, for orientation. At this time details concerning administrative matters such as transportation, identification, will be explained and communications arrangements will be explained by a representative of the Director of Communications.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):



25X1

Distribution:

DD/P
COP
A/DD/P/F
C/I&R
SSA-DD/S
C/FI
C/CI
C/PP
C/TSS
C/FE
C/WE
C/EE
C/SE
C/NEA
C/SR
C/WH
C/IO
[redacted]

-4-

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pertinent Excerpts from a Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies from the Office of Defense Mobilization, dated April 28, 1955, Subject: Operation Alert 1955.

1. Purpose and Scope: The purpose of the alert is to enable agencies to:

a. Evaluate the effectiveness of their relocation planning;

b. Determine present capability of conducting essential wartime functions of the Federal Government at relocation sites under conditions of sustained alert; and,

c. Test their ability to deal with problems arising under attack conditions. Each participating Department and Agency retains primary responsibility for the planning and conduct of its operation in this exercise.

The Cabinet record of action of the Cabinet meeting of April 22, 1955, at which time the participation of the Executive Agencies in Operation Alert 1955 was discussed is as follows: "The President emphasized the importance of thorough-going preparation for and participation in this operation by all concerned."

2. Definitions:

a. The term "essential wartime functions" is used to designate those groups of actions that have been determined as necessary to accomplish the purposes of the government in wartime. Each "essential wartime function" has been placed in one (in some cases more than one) of the following categories: (1) direct military operation; (2) direct support of military operation; (3) emergency disaster relief; (4) bedrock civilian operation; (5) other wartime civilian operation; and (6) desirable for wartime civilian operation.

b. "Operation Alert 1955": The entire period of June 15-16-17 and all activities conducted during the period from relocation sites including, concurrently,

(1) Testing of emergency relocation plans.

(2) Testing of the present capability of the agencies to conduct essential wartime functions of the Executive Branch of the federal government at relocation sites under conditions of sustained alert, i.e., current day-to-day business pertaining to the essential wartime functions will be handled from relocation sites. Restated, the assumption is that insofar as day-to-day activities pertaining to essential wartime functions are concerned, no attack has taken place, that Washington is intact, but the situation is critical and a partial relocation has been ordered.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(3) Testing of the agencies' capability to deal with problems arising under simulated attack conditions. Exercise problems will assume that enemy attack as developed in civil defense exercise standards has taken place. No further attacks will occur during the period of the test although there will be sporadic harassing enemy action during the period. All problems will be marked "UNCAP" to identify simulated papers from actual papers being handled in the other phase of the exercise.

3. Time Phasing: For the exercise proper, time phasing has been telescoped in order that agencies may test their ability to deal with problems arising under attack conditions. The three-day period will represent activities that the participating agencies would undertake the first 30 days after attack.

4. Sequence of Operational Play: Agency personnel scheduled for relocation will evacuate Washington on the audible simulated alert signal sounded at 12:05 PM EDT June 15. Until such time as they reach the sites, the nucleus crews already there will pick up all operations including (a) the initiating or playing of problems based on the assumed attack, and (b) the conducting of essential wartime functions. Each agency will continue the exercise in continuous play through 5:00 p.m. EST, Thursday, June 16. A skeleton duty force and communications will be maintained during the period from 5:00 p.m. EST, Thursday, June 16, through 8:00 a.m., EST Friday, June 17, at which time the activity will be resumed continuing through 5:00 p.m., EST.

5. Exercise Problems: Each agency will design problems to test command policy decisions, its operations, its interagency functions, and its activities which would require central review or discussion.

6. Pre-Test by Agencies: Each participating department and agency retains primary responsibility for the planning and conduct of its operations in this exercise. The following actions are important:

a. That agencies' staff understand the sense of urgency that underlies these operations and tests.

b. That adequate staff be assigned prior to operation alert to complete plans for the exercise including development of exercise problems.

c. That emergency action steps and mobilization plans be developed and coordinated.

d. That the period 2 May and 14 June be used to bring relocation sites to maximum emphasis on communications.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. Administrative Arrangements for Relocates Leaving the District of Columbia on June 15 and Related Civil Defense Items:

a. Purpose: To outline procedure to be followed in relocating Government employees from the District of Columbia and for the participation (of those remaining) in the Civil Defense Exercise at the Seat of Government on June 15.

b. Assumptions - Guidelines:

(1) That an audible simulated warning alert signal will initiate the exercise at 11:05 a.m., EST (12:05 Noon EDT) June 15.

(2) That the District of Columbia will direct evacuation of all buildings and conduct a "curb drill" to test evacuation- transportation arrangements.

(3) That only personnel designated to move to relocation sites will actually leave parking areas promptly.

c. General Instructions: Heads of agencies will proceed to their respective relocation sites unless otherwise directed.


All agency personnel not designated to proceed to relocation sites, including personnel designated to perform essential wartime functions but not participating in this ALERT, should be instructed to conform to procedures and standards to be separately transmitted from appropriate Civil Defense authorities and the Deputy Director of Civil Defense for Federal Buildings.

Despite the fact that by June 15 agencies will undoubtedly have issued both Civil Defense identification cards and Civil Defense vehicle markers to employees scheduled for relocation, minimum use of them should be made in this Alert. They may be used as necessary to assure the prompt exit of relocates from the Washington area. However, if other local communities are having a simulated "take cover" or red alert while relocates are enroute, do not use these cards or markers, but cooperate in the local exercise. It is permissible to use either or both if a local community is engaged in a simulated "warning" or yellow alert if its duration can be expected to delay relocates substantially in reaching their sites. While cards and markers will not normally be used publicly in the area of relocation sites or on site, exceptions where clearly in the interest of national security may be authorized by agency heads.

d. Evaluation: Reports on the experience of relocates in reaching sites should be submitted to the appropriate requesting authority.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25X1



Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP60-00050A000100010002-6

Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP60-00050A000100010002-6